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Spoofing identities using photographs is one of the
most common techniques to attack 2-D face recognition
systems. There seems to exist no comparative stud-
ies of different techniques using the same protocols and
data. The motivation behind this competition is to com-
pare the performance of different state-of-the-art algo-
rithms on the same database using a unique evaluation
method. Six different teams from universities around
the world have participated in the contest. Use of one
or multiple techniques from motion, texture analysis
and liveness detection appears to be the common trend
in this competition. Most of the algorithms are able
to clearly separate spoof attempts from real accesses.
The results suggest the investigation of more complex
attacks.
1. Introduction
Face recognition has been an active research topic
in the last two decades and its techniques are currently
deployed in access control systems. Facial recognition
has the advantage of non-intrusiveness over the other
biometric identification techniques such as irises and
finger prints. However, spoofing attacks is a major
threat causing problems to face recognition to be used
as a biometrics for high-security applications.
The use of facial photographs of a valid user to spoof
face recognition is the most common attack method,
as the photographs of the users are widely available
through websites like social networks. Even videos of
the users can be easily captured from distant cameras
without prior consent. To make face recognition as a
successful biometric identification technology, there ex-
ist the necessity of answering the spoofing attack prob-
lem .
Based on the clues used for attack detection, anti-
spoofing techniques for 2-D face recognition can be
roughly classified as motion, texture and liveness. Mo-
tion analysis techniques use the fact that, planar ob-
jects move significantly different from real human faces
which are 3-D objects. Kollreider et al . [13] evaluate
the trajectories of selected part of the face from the
short sequence of images using a simplified optical flow
analysis followed by a heuristic classifier. The same
authors introduce a method [14] to fuse these scores
with liveness properties such as eye-blinks or mouth
movements. Bao et al . [2] propose a method to detect
attacks produced with planar media using optical flow
based motion estimation.
Texture analysis techniques take the advantage of
detectable texture patterns such as printing failures,
and overall image blur to detect attacks. Li et al . [15]
detect print-attacks by exploiting differences in the
2-D Fourier spectra of hard-copies of faces and real-
accesses. The method works well for down-sampled
photo attacks, but is likely to fail for higher-quality
samples. Bai et al . [1] analyze the micro-textures us-
ing a linear SVM classifier to detect spoof attacks.
Liveness detection tries to classify attacks based
on the signs of life such as eye-blinks and mouth-
movements. Pan et al . [18, 19] bring a real-time live-
ness detection specifically against photo-spoofing using
eye-blinks.
In spite of several advances in anti-spoofing for
face recognition, there seems to exist no comparative
studies of different techniques on a publicly available
database. Therefore, the motivation behind this com-
petition is to compare the performance of different
state-of-the-art algorithms on the same database using
a unique evaluation method. Six different teams from
universities world-wide had participated in the contest,
they are Ambient Intelligence Laboratory (AMILAB),
Italy; Center for Biometrics and Security Research, In-
stitute of Automation, Chinese Academy of Sciences
(CASIA), China; Idiap Research Institute (IDIAP),
Switzerland; Universidad de Las Palmas de Gran Ca-
naria, (SIANI), Spain; Institute of Computing (UNI-
CAMP), Brazil; and Machine Vision Group (UOULU),
University of Oulu, Finland.
In Section 2, we briefly review the database and eval-
uation protocols used for the competition. Section 3
presents the algorithms of all six participants. We dis-
cuss the consolidated results of all algorithms in Section
4 and finally conclude the paper in Section 5.
2. Database & Protocols
For the competition, we used the publicly available
PRINT-ATTACK biometric (face) database1. The
database consists of 200 videos of real accesses and
200 videos of attack attempts of 50 different identi-
ties. Real access video sequences are captured with
320 by 240 pixel (QVGA) resolution, at 25 frames-per-
second and for 15 Seconds duration each. These real
access videos are recorded under two different back-
ground and illumination conditions. Attack attempts
are captured with the same resolution and frame rate,
for up to nine seconds duration under the same back-
ground and illumination conditions. Hard copies of
the digital photographs printed on plain A4 paper us-
ing color laser printer are used for recording attacks.
For attacks, two different support mechanisms are in-
stalled in-front of the input camera of the acquisition
system. The supports used are, hand-based in which
an attacker holds the client’s print in his hands and
fixed-support in which the print is attached to the wall.
In the competition, contestants were given access to
training and development data sets, each set contain-
ing 60 real accesses and 60 attack attempts. The sam-
ple identities for these data sets were drawn randomly
without repetition. All the teams were given a couple
of months to train and develop their classification sys-
tem. For training and development, participants were
1http://www.idiap.ch/dataset/printattack
free to use the entire video of each client, 375 frames
for real accesses and 230 for attack attempts. Then we
released the test data set containing 80 real access and
80 attack videos. All videos in the test set contained
230 frames. Files of the test data set are anonymized
to conceal the type of the video (real/attack, hand-
based/fixed-support) for true evaluation. Every par-
ticipant’s algorithm is supposed to yield a score after
processing 230 frames of each video in the test data set.
We had asked all the teams to provide two files con-
taining such scores, one for the development set and the
other for the test set. We were not interested in speed,
latency and complexity of the contestant’s method.
In order to compute the performance measure of
the spoofing detection systems, we first computed a
threshold at Equal Error Rate (EER) on the devel-
opment set scores. Then, on the test set scores us-
ing the same threshold, we computed Half Total Er-
ror Rate (HTER), which combines the False Rejection
Ratio (FRR) and the False Acceptance Ratio (FAR)
with 0.5 weight. Spoof detection accuracy is good if
FAR/FRR/HTER value is close to zero percent.
3. Methods
In this section, we consolidate the algorithms pro-
posed by the participants of the competition.
3.1. AMILAB
We faced the problem of detecting 2-D face spoofing
attacks performed by placing a printed photo of a real
user in front of the camera. Unfortunately, it is not
possible to relay just on the face movement as a clue of
vitality because the attacker can easily simulate such
a case and also because real users often show a “lower
vitality” during the authentication session. Therefore,
our approach consists of performing both video and
still image analysis in order to employ complementary
information about vitality and consequently to obtain
a more robust classification.
From our experience, an image analysis performed
over videos shows clear peculiar visual characteristics
for captured printed photos and real scenes. To de-
tect the differences we explored several different types
of visual features (e.g. color features, edges, textures
etc.), and we used a set of support vector machines
(SVMs) to compute a frame level confidence score of
being a real session or not. To obtain an high sepa-
ration between score distributions we combined these
similarity scores by means of the Dynamic Score Com-
bination methodology [25]. This type of analysis can
be performed also frame by frame.
Even if the peculiarities described above can be de-
tected, the vitality detection must be used to assess
a certain degree of scene reality. We computed two
more vitality scores on videos: the first one is based on
the average movement caught by a common motion de-
tection technique [16], the second one depends on the
number of eye blinks [4]. Blinks are a proof of vitality,
but nothing can be inferred in case of their absence.
Conversely low degrees of movement imply an attack
but movement is not distinctive for hand attacks and
real sessions.
Combination was performed at score level as a
weighted sum: photo detection provided excellent re-
sults, therefore it was given a higher weight in combina-
tion; movement measures provided some contribution
only for fixed photo attacks therefore the score is used
only in case of very little movement. By taking into ac-




α · simage analysis + (1− α) · sblinks,
if smotion is high
α1 · simage analysis + α2 · sblinks + α3 · smotion,
if smotion is low
3.2. CASIA
Our method is based on the following intuitive three
observations: (1) Real access videos tend to have non-
rigid motions, especially in the eye and mouth regions,
while printed photos only have rigid transformations
like translation, scaling, and rotation; (2) Real ac-
cess videos tend to have less noise than those spoofing
videos; (3) Real access videos only have local motions
in the face region while spoofing videos usually have
global motions spread-out the whole support. We an-
alyze these three clues and construct three classifiers
based on them respectively.
Classifier 1 - Non-Rigid Motion: The non-
rigid motions in real faces are detected by a batch
image alignment technique proposed in [21], called
“RASL”. Since the spoofing videos are generated by
the fixed or hand-shaking printed photos, the motion
of these videos can be well modeled by affine trans-
formation. RASL algorithm has the ability to align a
series of affine transformed images, therefore the frames
of spoofing videos can be well aligned. For real faces,
due to the non-rigid motions, there still be having large
variations in the aligned frames. For this reason, the
differences of the aligned frames are used to construct
the first classifier.
Classifier 2 - Noise: The spoofing videos usually
are noisier than those in real faces. Following the meth-
ods in [8] and [7], noise variance can be estimated by a




y(i, j) ∈ HH1 (1)
where HH1 means the first order wavelet decomposi-
tion of a image. In our experiments, we have tested
several wavelet basis functions and find that the Haar
wavelet is efficient to evaluate the noise in images. The
noise differences between the real and spoofing videos
are used to construct the second classifier.
Classifier 3 - Face-Background Dependency:
Generally, the motion of a real face is independent
of the background. On the contrary, the background
around the face is usually moving together with the face
in printed photo attacks. This is another significant
feature to differentiate the real and spoofing videos.
Specifically, we use the GMM background modeling
method [12] to detect the background and Viola-Jones
face detector [26] to detect the face area. The ratio
of motion in the face region and background is used
to evaluate the face-background dependency, which is
used to construct the third classifier.
Classifiers Fusion: In our system, the three clas-
sifiers are learned by logistic regression respectively.
Classifier 1 and classifier 3 are fused to predict scores of
videos with complex background, and classifier 1 and
classifier 2 are used to predict scores of videos with uni-
form background. Since the background condition can
be easily classified by edge detection, all the procedures
are automatic.
3.3. UNICAMP
A careful observation of the facial spoofing attack
samples provides some insights regarding the charac-
teristics that can be explored to design a classification
method. In a real access to the system, the person is
able to perform slight movements with the head as well
as there may exist eye blinking. On the other hand, in
an attempt of attack, since a picture is being used, the
movements of the head are not independent from the
background, the face and the background are in the
same plane, there is no eye blinking, and the quality of
the printed photo might be a clue by itself.
It is valuable, therefore, to explore both spatial and
temporal information to learn differences (even slight
ones) between the two classes. This suggests the use
of an approach able to locate discriminative regions
within the face. Our solution employs a holistic repre-
sentation of the face region through a robust set of low-
level feature descriptors, so that differences between
classes can be estimated directly in the feature space,
which is less prone to variations resulting from uncon-
trolled acquisition conditions [23], common in this do-
main.
Given that a holistic representation is being consid-
ered without explicit modeling of the characteristics
to be captured (e.g., head movements and eye blink-
ing), it is important to use a robust description of the
samples so that models dependent on the application
domain can be expendable. Such a description can be
obtained with the combination of feature channels fo-
cusing on different image characteristics, such as shape,
color, and texture [24].
The anti-spoofing proposed solution integrates fea-
ture descriptors based on histogram of oriented gra-
dients (HOG) [6], gray level co-occurrence matrix
(GLCM) [11], and histograms of shearlet coefficients
(HSC) [22] with a weighting scheme based on partial
least squares (PLS) regression [27].
To exploit both temporal and spatial information,
a sample video containing n frames is divided into m
parts, such that the feature extraction is performed
for every k-th frame, where k = bn/mc. The feature
extraction for the t-th frame of the j-th sample (after
face detection, cropping, and resizing) is performed as
follows. The frame is split into overlapping blocks with
different sizes and strides to create a feature vector dj,t.
Finally, when a video sample has descriptors extracted
from all its selected frames, a high-dimensional feature
vector vj = [dj,1, dj,k+1,dj,2k+1, . . . , dj,(m−1)k+1]T
is composed to describe the j-th sample.
To estimate a PLS regression model, we use a set
of real access and attempt of attack training samples
Sr = {sr1, sr2, . . . , sro} and Sa = {sa1, sa2, . . . , sap},
respectively. Once the faces are detected, cropped
and rescaled to a common size, descriptors are ex-
tracted from a selected number of frames and then
concatenated to compose a feature vector. This pro-
cess results in two matrices, Vr = [vr1,vr2, . . . ,vro]
and Va = [va1,va2, . . . ,vap] representing the real ac-
cess and attempt of attack classes, respectively, with
feature vectors on their columns.
With the availability of a matrix X = [Vr, Va]
T and
the response vector y with its first o elements equals
to +1 and its last p elements equals to −1, indicating
the sample class labels, the PLS regression model can
be learned. The estimated regression coefficients are
stored in a vector β to be used during the test.
When a sample video is presented to the system,
the face is detected and the frames are cropped and
rescaled. Then, the vector vj , resulting from the fea-
ture extraction, is projected onto β. The response in-
dicates whether this sample is a real access or an attack
attempt.
3.4. IDIAP
Photograph attacks, when executed with hard-
copies, may suffer from print artifacts or failures that
can be used as counter-measure to spoofing. Our pro-
posed scheme processes each video by accumulating a
single Local Binary Pattern (LBP) code histogram [17]
with data from every single image in the stream. The
histogram is matched against a pre-calculated model,
using the χ2 method as proposed on the same reference
to generate a final score.
The input video is first converted into gray-scale be-
fore passing through the LBP operator configured to
use a radius R = 1 and the 8 surrounding pixels. The
2-D outputs of the LBP operator are accumulated in a
global histogram with 256 bins for all input images in
the sequence. After the video input has finished, the
global histogram is compared to a reference histogram
for attacks, generated using all images from all videos
of attacks available at the training set. The output of
the χ2 statistics is ready for classification without any
further treatment.
3.5. SIANI
To solve the task, we have made the assumption that
the evolution of the face appearance and its location in
the image are important cues to distinguish between
real and attack videos. Thus, this approach is based
on the detection data collected by the ENCARA2 face
detector [3]. The face detector features each sequence
as a whole to include the temporal information.
The detection data provided by ENCARA2 when-
ever a face is located are: the face container, and, if
available, the eyes, nose, and mouth locations.
To compute the sequence features, we have analyzed
the information given by the facial element locations,
and a simple difference image with the previous frame.
This analysis provides information of interest based on
the face and facial elements motion to detect an attack.
For that reason we have computed basic statistics
on the facial element locations and specific areas of the
difference image. In this sense, the mean position and
variance are computed for each element location.
Also, the difference image is analyzed in some spe-
cific areas. These specific areas are defined according
to the face container, which divides the image into two
areas: the face and the non face areas. Additionally,
if both eyes are located, the distance between them is
calculated and used to estimate the areas of interest
around both eyes and the mouth. In summary, up to
five areas of interest are featured: face, non face, eyes
and mouth. A measure based on the difference image is
computed for all those areas and normalized attending
to their respective size.
The classification of the videos between real and at-
tacks is done with the Bayesian Network approach [20]
included in the Weka open source software [10]. Among
the different algorithms available we have selected the
Chow and Liu algorithm [5], that reported the best re-
sults for the devel set. The results achieved for both
sets allow the possibility of selecting a threshold to have
0% FAR for both test and devel sets.
3.6. UOULU
Our spoofing detection approach was inspired by im-
age quality assessment and characterization of printing
artifacts [9]. It is assumed that the face prints contain
printing quality defects which can be recognized using
texture features. Based on this, the system can detect
whether there is a live person in front of the camera or
a face print.
The proposed system considers only single video
frames for liveness detection and performs texture anal-
ysis on a window containing the face area and its
surrounding regions. First, a Sobel horizontal edge-
emphasizing filter is applied to highlight the image de-
fects and to produce a gradient image from which a
single local binary pattern (LBP) feature histogram
is computed [17]. The LBP representation (LBPu28,2)
computed over the preprocessed face image and its sur-
rounding regions encodes the occurrences of local tex-
ture primitives and describes well the differences be-
tween a real face and a printed face image. The 59-bin
histogram is fed to an SVM classifier which determines
whether or not the window contains a real face.
4. Discussion
Table 1 summarizes the performance of the algo-
rithms of all the participants. We have observed that
all teams are using one or multiple clues obtained
clearly from three types of techniques – motion anal-
ysis, texture analysis and liveness detection. Three
teams had achieved HTER of zero percent on test
set. Two teams, IDIAP and UOULU have obtained
zero percent EER on development set and zero percent
HTER on test set based on texture analysis method.
This leads to the conclusion that, the attack videos
in this database mainly consist of detectable texture
patterns. Incidentally both teams use LBP as the base
technique to compute scores for classification. The CA-
SIA team has presented a method with the combina-
tion of motion and texture analysis techniques, and
the method also allows switching between detection
schemes based on the scene context. Even though this
method has reported perfect detection only on test set,
the scheme appears to be robust, but at the expense of
complexity. The AMILAB and the UNICAMP teams
used all three experts in deriving the detection scheme.
The AMILAB team has reported near-perfect result
with only one false rejection on the test set. The UNI-
CAMP team also has reported near-perfect results with
one false acceptance and one false rejection on the de-
Team
Development Test
FAR FRR FAR FRR HTER
AMILAB 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.25 0.63
CASIA 1.67 1.67 0.00 0.00 0.00
IDIAP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
SIANI 1.67 1.67 0.00 21.25 10.63
UNICAMP 1.67 1.67 1.25 0.00 0.63
UOULU 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table 1. Performance figures of the different teams. All
values are in percentage (%).


















Table 2. Different teams on the usage of techniques. Here,√
means the team is using corresponding technique.
velopment set, and one false acceptance on the test
set. In spite of good performance on the development
set, the SIANI team’s detection method is not able to
generalize the classification on the test set. Table 2
presents the usage of techniques by different teams for
detecting attacks.
5. Conclusion
To the best of our knowledge this is the first com-
petition to compare state-of-the-art counter measures
to 2-D facial spoofing attacks on a publicly available
database. From the results, we clearly see that mo-
tion analysis, texture analysis, and liveness detection
are three important means to obtain the clues for de-
tecting print based spoof attacks. The usage of one or
multiple techniques for detection appears to be a com-
mon trend. However, the usage of a single technique
also has shown to be efficient.
A possible future investigation would be to compute
performance at regular intervals of time instead of ob-
taining score for the whole video at once. The majority
of the teams are able to clearly separate attacks from
real accesses. This suggests that the problem should
be made more complex, for instance expanding the
database with photo quality print attacks.
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